Introduction
Meaning, according to a significant number of philosophers, is an intrinsically normative notion. 1 For this reason, it is suggested, meaning is not conducive to a naturalistic explanation. In this paper, I shall not address whether this is indeed so. Nor shall I present arguments in support of the normativity thesis (see Glock 2005; Kripke 1982 ). Instead, I
shall examine and respond to two forceful objections recently (and independently) raised against it by Boghossian (2005) , Hattiangadi (2006) and Miller (2006) . Although I shall argue that the objections are unsuccessful, they are worth attending to, not only because the normativity thesis is so widely accepted and is thought to have such ramifications but, most importantly, because doing so offers the opportunity to help clarify how it is to be understood.
2 1 See, e.g., Alston 2000; Baker and Hacker 2004; Blackburn 1984; Boghossian 1989; Brandom 1994; Gibbard 1994; Glock 2005; Kripke 1982; Lance and O'Leary Hawthorne 1998; McDowell 1998: ch. 11; Putnam 1991: 11ff.; Wright 1992; Waismann and Wittgenstein 2003: 87ff. 2 Of course, there are other arguments against the claim that meaning is intrinsically normative (e.g. (1) Most people in Cornwall accept that murder is wrong.
Correlatively, although the following has the surface form of a description, it might be used to express a rule and hence might be normative (albeit implicitly):
(2) The starting-position of a rook is a corner square.
Hattiangadi suggests that what is distinctive of normative statements is that they 'tell us what to do, whereas non-normative statements simply describe how things are ' (2006: 221 Hence, it is reasonable to take the normativity thesis to involve a commitment to the following principle, where 'w' is a word, 'F' gives its meaning, and 'f' is that feature in virtue of which w applies:
According to (C), to say that meaning is normative is to say that for an expression to have a meaning is for it to possess conditions of correct application.
The first thing to note is that if 'applies correctly to' expresses a norm then it is what one might call a word-world norm. That is, it specifies how an expression correctly applies to features of reality, and so is equivalent to 'is true of'. To support this contention and make it more concrete, consider the analogy
Hattiangadi offers in support of her claim:
... think of theme park rides where there is a minimum height requirement for some of the more dangerous rides. This is a standard children must meet if they are to go on the ride.
But however happy [a child] may be to meet the standard, whether or not she does is a straightforwardly non-normative, natural fact. (2006: 224) It is true that, in order to meet the standard, and so for her going on the ride to satisfy the conditions of correctness, certain descriptions must be true of a child, namely that she is sufficiently tall. That is, certain 'straightforwardly non-normative, natural facts' must hold, and can be derived from the statement that she satisfies the relevant norm.
Nevertheless, given that the standard is in force, that the child does as a matter of fact meet it (or fails to) certainly has implications for whether or not she may (or should not) go on the ride. If she were to do so incorrectly, with the norm in place, sanctions or criticism of one form or another would be appropriate. Hence, the norm is action-guiding, and to say that there are correctness-conditions for a child's going on a ride is to say that going on that ride is a normative matter.
Likewise, if a statement about the meaning of an expression does indeed imply that there are conditions for its correct application, as Boghossian and Hattiangadi accept, then it 6 equally has implications for whether it may or should be used in certain ways. I shall not argue for the antecedent of this conditional here, but if it really is platitudinous, then it is platitudinous that meaning is normative. Boghossian and Hattiangadi are wrong to claim that one can accept a principle such as (C) without thereby accepting the normativity thesis.
Note that nothing said in this section implies that truth itself is a normative notion. If it is correct for a person to go on a ride only if that person is 4ft or taller, then being 4ft or taller makes it correct. Obviously, however, that property is a non-normative one.
Likewise, if being true makes the use of an expression correct (according to the standard set by meaning), it does not follow from that fact alone that being true is a normative property.
Prescriptivity
Having rejected (C) as capturing the content of the claim that meaning is intrinsically normative, Hattiangadi offers an alternative on behalf of its proponent (2006: 226):
(P) w means F → ∀x (w ought to be applied to x ↔ x is f ) According to (P), statements about meaning immediately imply a prescription, and not merely a statement of correctness-conditions.
In the previous section, I argued that (C) is indeed normative in the sense required for advocates of the normativity thesis. Nevertheless, it is worth considering (P) since, first, many philosophers have in mind such a principle when discussing the normativity of Of course (P) as stated is obviously false. Given what it means, one is not obliged to employ an expression such as 'dog' to all dogs. Indeed, doing so is not even possible and, in so far as ought implies can, there can be no such requirement.
Since (P) is to be rejected, one who holds that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion might instead advocate the following:
(P**) w means F → ∀x (w ought to be applied to x → x is f )
According to (P**), if 'rich' means rich then 'rich' ought to be applied to something only if that something is rich. Norms of this kind are action-guiding, and allow one to evaluate the use of expressions as right or wrong.
However, Hattiangadi argues that even principles of the form expressed by (P**) do not hold:
Under some circumstances, I might be obligated to tell a lie, which does not imply that I mean something non-standard by my expressions. (2006: 227) Imagine a person's life will be saved if I apply the term 'rich' to one who is poor. It would seem that I ought to do so, but it hardly follows that 'rich' no longer means rich. It 8 appears, therefore, that once unpacked as involving a commitment to (P**), the claim that meaning is intrinsically normative becomes decidedly less convincing.
It is certainly the case that one can imagine circumstances in which one is required to use an expression in a way that fails to accord with its standard meaning, without it following that the expression has a non-standard meaning. But to say that meaning is normative is only to say that expressions are governed by distinctively semantic proprieties. One can hold this while acknowledging that such norms might be trumped by other normative considerations, say ethical, epistemic, or prudential. That, all things considered, I am obliged to use an expression in a way that does not accord with its meaning is perfectly compatible with the fact that there is a semantic norm that speaks in favour (or against) a particular use of an expression, and in virtue of which that expression means what it does.
Another way to put this point is to say that the norms of meaning generate prima facie obligations.
Prima facie obligations
One might complain, however, that this is equally implausible. As Hattiangadi points out, prima facie obligations are only overridden by other obligations, but it appears that alleged semantic obligations can be overridden by mere desires (2006: 232). For example, if I have no desire to tell the truth, I have no obligation to use 'rich' of a person only if she is rich. Consider also the contrapositive of the consequent of (P**):
(P***) w means F → ∀x (x is not f → w ought not to be applied to x) Moreover, the mere fact that there might be a hypothetical imperative concerning the use of an expression, given its meaning, is trivial. With a suitable desire, anything might be normative in this sense, and it certainly does not pose a problem for the naturalist. This is expressed by Boghossian, who writes that any normativity to meaning 'is mere hypothetical normativity, and that is uninteresting ' (2005: 207) . Likewise, Miller writes:
The most that can be said is that if Neil means magpie by 'magpie' then given that he has a desire to communicate, or perhaps a desire to think the truth, or a desire to conform to his prior semantic intentions, he has a reason to apply 'magpie' to an object if and only if it is a magpie. Semantic reasons are at most only hypothetical reasons for action. changes, and I apply the term to a poor person, it remains the case that I am not applying it as it should be applied, but rather incorrectly. Here, it seems one is properly entitled and it makes full sense to judge that, desire notwithstanding, I am using the expression wrongly. (Of course, I could excuse my behaviour by citing the relevant desire, but that is not the same as overriding the norm.)
So, unlike the case where an ethical obligation overrides the semantic obligation to employ an expression in a given way, it does not appear that a mere desire can do so.
Hence, it has yet to be shown that any requirement to employ a word only if certain conditions obtain is contingent upon a speaker's desires. We have not yet been given reason to doubt that (P**) holds.
Conclusion
I have defended the thesis that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion against recent objections from Boghossian, Hattiangadi and Miller. These objections purport to show that either meaning is not normative at all, or that it is not in any respect that might be thought to be troubling for the naturalist. In response, I have argued that statements about correctness-conditions are suitably normative, and moreover that no reason has been given to deny that what an expression means generates (prima facie) requirements to use that expression in a certain way.
